Struct AvatarUploadCredentialRequest 

pub struct AvatarUploadCredentialRequest { /* private fields */ }

Implementations

impl AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

pub fn issue( &self, aci: Aci, zk_credential_key_pub: &ZkCredentialPublicKey, rotation_id: u64, redemption_time: Timestamp, params: &GenericServerSecretParams, randomness: RandomnessBytes, ) -> Result<AvatarUploadCredentialResponse, ZkGroupVerificationFailure>

Server-side: verify the Cm well-formedness proof and issue a blinded credential.

The server must authenticate the client to obtain aci, and must supply zk_credential_key_pub from its record for that account. The Cm well-formedness proof binds the blinded commitment to this zk_credential_key_pub, so passing the wrong value will fail proof verification.

rotation_id is a server-chosen value that the client must already have folded into the commitment Cm = [aci]*H1 + [zk_credential_key_secret]*H2 + [rotation_id]*H3. The server supplies its own rotation_id here; the well-formedness proof is verified against it, so a client that committed to a different value will fail issuance. The server never learns Cm (it stays blinded) yet still controls the rotation ID.

Client-enforced invariant: The client must enforce that the server only changes rotation_id when the client’s ZK credential key is rotated. Otherwise a malicious server can fingerprint a client across credential issuances by varying rotation_id while the client’s ACI and ZK credential key are stable: the server can recompute [delta_rotation_id]*H3 for any candidate (aci, zk_credential_key_pub) pair and check whether the observed Cm-delta matches (of course it would have to test all pairs because it wouldn’t know which ones had the same (aci,zk_credential_key_pub), but finding a match would still be meaningful). With this invariant, observing two distinct rotation IDs for the same account proves the ZK credential key has rotated, which severs the linkability of pre- and post-rotation avatar slots.

Trait Implementations

impl Clone for AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

fn clone(&self) -> AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

Returns a duplicate of the value.

fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)

Performs copy-assignment from source.

impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

fn deserialize<__D>(__deserializer: __D) -> Result<Self, __D::Error>

where __D: Deserializer<'de>,

Deserialize this value from the given Serde deserializer.

impl PartialDefault for AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

fn partial_default() -> Self

Returns a value that can be safely dropped or assigned over.

impl Serialize for AvatarUploadCredentialRequest

fn serialize<__S>(&self, __serializer: __S) -> Result<__S::Ok, __S::Error>

where __S: Serializer,

Serialize this value into the given Serde serializer.