pub async fn message_decrypt_prekey<R: Rng + CryptoRng>(
ciphertext: &PreKeySignalMessage,
remote_address: &ProtocolAddress,
local_address: &ProtocolAddress,
session_store: &mut dyn SessionStore,
identity_store: &mut dyn IdentityKeyStore,
pre_key_store: &mut dyn PreKeyStore,
signed_pre_key_store: &dyn SignedPreKeyStore,
kyber_pre_key_store: &mut dyn KyberPreKeyStore,
csprng: &mut R,
) -> Result<PreKeyDecryptResult>Expand description
Decrypt a PreKeySignalMessage from remote_address.
If a session for the incoming base key already exists, the inner
SignalMessage is decrypted against that session directly. This covers
both retransmitted pre-key messages and messages 1+ of the initial chain,
which all carry the same base key. The peer’s identity is always
trust-checked, but only saved for an active session. Messages on existing
archived sessions cannot replace the stored identity.
Otherwise this builds a candidate session from the pre-key material,
AEAD-verifies the inner SignalMessage against the candidate, and only
commits the session + consumes pre-keys + saves identity on AEAD success.
This enforces the protocol invariant that a session is committed only after
AEAD decrypts.